**Greg Gandenberger**

**Abstract:** The Law of Likelihood is the central thesis of likelihoodism, one of three major schools of thought about the notion of evidence in science (Sober, 2008, Ch. 1). It says that datum E favors hypothesis H1 over H2 if and only if the likelihood function k = Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H2) > 1, in which case k measures the degree of that favoring. I propose to restrict the Law of Likelihood to mutually exclusive hypotheses. This proposal seems natural and suffices to block a counterexample due to Fitelson (2007, 476- 7), but it faces at least three significant objections: (1) it conflicts with plausible constraints on the notion of evidential favoring, (2) it fails to address the tacking paradox, and (3) it seems to exclude cases involving competing causal claims and cases involving nested models. I respond to each of those objections.